Introduction
In 1995 the Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia, the Honourable Justice Alastair Nicholson recognised that "spousal violence" was rarely regarded as relevant in decisions of the Family Court. It was his Honour's view that practitioners did not believe spousal violence was relevant under the Family Law Act 1975 and this was reflected in the lack of arguments involving spousal violence. His Honour acknowledged the not surprising result was criticism of the Court, but argued such criticism should lie with the Legislature rather than the Court. 1 His Honour further stated cases involving family violence had not been reported "due apparently to a belief they do not involve significant issues of law". 2 Since 1995, the Legislature have purported to answer this concern via the introduction of the Family Law Reform Act 1995 ("the Act"). We now see "family violence" as a mandatory factor the Family Court of Australia ("the Court") is to take into account when determining what is in the 'best interests of the child' in custody (now residence/specific issues orders) and access (now contact) hearings. 3 The Court has subsequently taken a number of steps to inform them of the existence of family violence. For example, the Courts Form 12A application for Consent Orders requires disclosure of pending or current family Violence Orders. The pro forma affidavits used in the Brisbane Registry for interim hearings require disclosure of the existence of family violence. This is noteworthy and consistent with attempts by the Court to address this difficult issue. However, without doubt there is a paucity of reported cases dealing with domestic violence (named "family violence" throughout the Act and for the purposes of this paper), particularly in custody /residence decisions. 4 The "silence" is even more pronounced in interim residence decisions. 5 It is the writer's experience 8 that prior to the Act's commencement the Court rarely regarded family violence as significant when determining the welfare or "best interests" of the child on an interim custody hearing. It is my view that women leaving the family home with the children are at risk of losing the interim care and control of their children despite their reason for flight being a violent partner. This seems to be attributable to the interpretation of the principles laid down In the marriage ofCilento 7 and later approved In the marriage of Griffiths H and a lack of appreciation by some members of the judiciary of the impact upon children living with a violent parent.
The interests of children will best be met by ensuring a degree of stability in their lives until a matter can be fully investigated by the Court and full hearing of the issues within a reasonable time. Unnecessary disruption to the life of the children should therefore be avoided. If the child has remained in the matrimonial home after separation with one party this stability will usually be ensured by continuing that arrangement, unless convincing proof that the child's physical or mental health or moral welfare will be really endangered by the children remaining in that home with that party until a contested application is heard. 9 Experience has shown that family violence directed at one's partner, is rarely regarded by the Court as a disqualifying factor to argue against a perpetrator equating himself and the family home as "stability", nor as "convincing proof" that the 4 The term "custody" will be used for those decisions and period referred to by me, pre the Act. The term "residence" will be used for decisions and periods post the Act. Given the infancy of this legislation, no reported decisions specifically dealing with the Court's consideration of family violence and interim residence could be located. Concern over the Court's approach to family violence was highlighted in the Australian Law Reform Commission Report Equality Before the Law -Justice for Women Report No 69 Part I AGPS, Canberra, 1994, pl67. It was noted therein "evidence of violence against a spouse is often excluded or discounted at different stages of the legal system and the Family Court often does not give proper weight to the existence and the affect of violence". 5
The "silence" with respect to family violence and the new Act is identified by J Behrens in "Ending the Silence, But... Family Violence Under the Family Law Reform Act 1995 Act " (1996 10 AJFL 35. It is acknowledged the frequency and nature of interim hearings make it economically impossible for regular reporting, however the writer could only locate one reported decision, In the marriage of Merriman (1994) FLC 92-497 to reflect the Court's attitude towards family violence when considering interim custody decisions. 6
The writer is a former member (1995) (1996) (1997) of the Queensland Domestic Violence Council and has specialised exclusively in family law from 1987. The writer is currently a consultant practising in the area. 7 (1980 ) FLC 90-847. 8 (1981 In the marriage of Cilento (1980) FLC 90-847 at 75-346. 10 This definition is a variation of the definition contained in a Practice Direction issued by the Chief Justice. "Direction as to the Management of Cases Involving Family Violence", 15 January 1993: "For the purpose of the Family Court of Australia, family violence may be defined as conduct by one immediate or extended family member which causes harm to another member to an extent which creates apprehension or fear for that member's personal well-being or safety. This conduct may be threatened. It may take the form of physical or emotional abuse or a combination of both. Family members include spouses, defacto spouses, separated spouses, children and close relatives." 11 For a discussion of this point, see National Committee of Violence Against Women Position Paper on Domestic Violence AGPS, Canberra, 1991. 12 It is noted that most State definitions of "domestic violence" are based on past violent and/or intimidating conduct. For example, see Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act 1989 (Qld), si 1(1). J Behrens, supra n5 at 37 is of the view the term "family violence" is even less acceptable than the more commonly used "domestic violence." She states "domestic" with all its implications of "just a domestic" at least cannot be taken to qualify the violence by reference to the engendered perpetrator." It is suggested that the definition proposed by the National Committee on Violence Against Women supra nil at 4 is an appropriate definition: "Male violence against women isbehaviour by the man adopted to control his victim which results in physical, sexual and/or psychological damage for social isolation or economic depravation or behaviour which leaves a woman living in fear; physical violence generally includes all types assault and torture ... severity of injuries ranges from no visible signs to permanent injury and/or death; fear instilled in victims adds another dimension to the dynamic of violence against women. The fear of future violence often becomes the most powerful weapon in the impression of women; threats are another common controlling mechanism used by the perpetrator; psychological abuse includes emotional and verbal of violent households contained children and 68% of those children were abused by the violent partner. 1H The number of applications in Queensland for a Domestic abuse and is usually experienced by victims as damaged to their self-concept and mental well-being. Over time a woman's belief in her worth, her self-concept and her sense of having rights or choices, becomes eroded by the incessant condemnatory abuse from the perpetrator; social abuse is behaviour which aims to isolate the woman from friends and family and is another method employed to control the woman. It includes public insults and denigration, forbidding any contact with family and friends, imprisoning the woman in the home and disconnecting the telephone; economic abuse refers to the inequitable control over access to shared resources. In family context for example this may mean a man is in a position to allocate insufficient funds for household purchases and/or control the woman's income, assets and expenditure; sexual violence encompasses all sexual acts, including any sexual behaviour that has been imposed or forced upon a woman without her freely giving consent". (Roberts 1981) . It is acknowledged however that some women are perpetrators of family violence. It is submitted however that statistically these are in the minority of cases. Female perpetrators as a genre are described in some detail in JR Johnston "Domestic Violence and Parent-Child Relationships in Families Disputing Custody" (1995) 9 AJFL 12. 15 Queensland Domestic Violence Taskforce, Beyond These Walls Department of Family Services, Brisbane, 1988, inter alia, the incidence of domestic violence in Queensland. 16 The Taskforce Report supra nl5, also indicated 22% of the victims had suffered broken bones and 1 in 4 battered women are pregnant. In H Macdonald "Women's Safety in Australia: An ABS Survey" Issue No 2, May 1997 at 7 it was indicated that 67.6% of physical violence experienced perpetrated by a male comprised "a threat or attempt to physically assault (which included the threat/attempt to hit with a fist or anything else, to stab with a knife, to shoot with a gun)"; 62.9% comprised pushing, grabbing and/or shoving; 25.4% comprised slapping; 21.3% comprised kicking, biting, punching; 20.9% comprised throwing anything that could hurt; .16% comprised beating, 10.7% comprised hitting with something; 10.6% comprised choking; 1.3% comprised stabbing, shooting; 49% were listed as other (ABS 1996 A:26) . For limitations with respect to this survey see H Macdonald at 5 which include objectivity of information and failure to include information with respect to emotional abuse. Profound emotional abuse is the unacknowledged experience of children in these families; exposure to the extreme conflict, coercive control and psychological abuse which characterises violent situations raises questions about our handling of these cases in other than the child protection framework. Witnessing violence may be the worst form of psychological and emotional abuse that children can be exposed to.
The desensitising experience of being exposed to violence, often over years, is summed up in the following quote:
These children have witnessed their mothers being beaten, thrown into walls, pushed through windows and having their eyes blackened and teeth knocked out. They have often lived through years of brutality which becomes so much a part of their home lives that they have little appreciation of what normal should be (Josse Wolf and Wilson 1990). 19 Purvis argues that a systems response is required by the Court if family violence is to be handled to the benefit of children. 20 She notes "research findings are establishing that a child's social and emotional functioning is significantly altered by exposure to violence. Problems have been identified in children's socio-emotional development, behaviour with peers, parents and teachers, academic performance, school related problems such as poor attendance, distractibility and school phobias, and disturbed behaviours such as extreme withdrawal and passivity or aggressiveness and conduct disorders (Butterworth and Fulmer, 1991). 21 17 See J Putt and K Higgins "Violence Against Women in Australia" Australian Institute of Criminology, Research & Public Policy Series No 6, 1996 Johnston argues that groups A and E were the most likely to be unable to separate their own needs from their children.
After the separation these abusive men depend upon their children for validation and caretaking or blatantly try to use their children as a way of reconciling with or punishing their separating spouse... As a group, these children have the most serious, emotional and behavioural problems. They are both frightened of and attracted to the more powerful, dangerous father. They are susceptible to being courted by him and often become behaviourally difficult and disrespectful towards the victims mother. It is very common for these children, especially the boys, to become physically aggressive with their mothers, in behaviour reminiscent of what they witnessed with their father. Other factors being equal, sole of joint residential arrangements for children are contra-indicated with a father who has engaged in on-going or episodic battering, as they are with any parent who is psychotic or has paranoid delusions. In fact, in these cases, visitation with a violent parent may need to be supervised or even suspended, especially if the threat of violence is current. Furthermore, tremendous care needs to be taken so as not to jeopardise the victim parent's safety as a consequence of the children's access plan.
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Johnston is of the view that the parents who have no history of violence in the marriage but rather the violence is limited to only brief occurrences at the time of a stressful separation or divorce (type D) are those that have the best prognosis to more rapidly restore their relationship with their children and to cooperatively coparent their children with the ex-spouse.
Other factors being equal, a range of custody plans including joint physical custody are appropriate. Although children in these situation are likely to be acutely traumatised by these unexpected scenes of violence and both parents profoundly shaken by the incidents, brief crisis oriented family therapy can help resolve their mutual anxieties, fears and guilt. This was a rule of marriage in the late 15th Century, by a Medieval Christian Scholar. The limitation on the husband's "right/duty" to beat upon his wife was known as the "Rule of Thumb". This rule specified beatings were to be restricted to a stick no larger than the right thumb.
TONI DICK (1998) family violence is an important factor in custody and access decisions.™ The US Courts, as in Australia, seem to vary in their approach to domestic violence, some giving significant weight to the matter and others discounting it. :M One commentator suggests the Judiciary in the United States is still uninformed about family violence and the danger it poses to adult and child victims and "consider the abuse of wives or mothers by male partners is largely irrelevant to parenting, concluding either that the men who are violent towards their partners may nonetheless be very good fathers and that domestic violence has little effect on the children or even if the father was violent during cohabitation he will cease beating and terrorising the mother upon separation."' 15 The view that the victim is somehow to blame for the violence and thus the violence can be discounted as an "acrimonious relationship" appears to be widespread. Ruth Busch™ describes it as a "two to tango analysis" of domestic violence. In that case the Court ruled that an abusive husband did not pose a danger to his child although his behaviour included throwing his wife to the ground, beating her when she was four months pregnant and threatening to kill her, her father and himself. The Court accepted a psychologist's conclusion that the man's "past violence was related to the deterioration of his relationship with his wife" and was presumably unrelated to his fitness as a parent. Cahn also cites another case of Hielmann v Novak 771p2d 948. Testimony was provided that the defendant actually hired someone for $5,000 to kill his wife. In this case the Court acknowledged that the father beat and repeatedly threatened to kill the mother, yet considered the abuse as only part of the evidence that the parties had an "acrimonious and contentious relationship". Cahn makes the point that "rather than concluding it was not in the best interest of the child to award joint custody because of the father's behaviour, the Court held that in light of the parent's relationship joint custody was 'impractical'. 14 QUTLJ She Gave as Good as She Got?
Except in the most unusual circumstances it isn't helpful to apportion blame (between the parties). I don't see it as a black and white situation where the aggressor is totally responsible and the victim is totally exculpated from any responsibility because I don't think it is commonsense or human nature for one party for no reason whatsoever to up and knock someone else on the nose. If someone was mentally disordered or -1 can't really think of any other reason why someone just gets up and hits another person. I think that in the context of a relationship or marriage of two people what goes through my mind -1 will express it but it is totally inadequate and probably not helpful -but "it takes two to tango". The two are entwined to the degree that I don't accept that one person alone is responsible for violence. If the violence is repeated over and over again until it gets to the stage that the victim is just a punchbag then I suppose at that stage there is just one person who is totally responsible, but I don't think those cases are very numerous. Hopefully they're not. I think that the vast number of cases fall within the middle range. Not someone mentally deranged who just up and hit someone for absolutely no reason whatsoever, not are they cases where the victim is just being used as a punchbag willy nilly. The vast number of cases is in the mental category. This is where there is interplay and there is not necessarily a taunting, but to put it a its best there is a lack of sensitivity on the part of both parties.-' 1 * Subsequent to these interviews being undertaken, the Domestic Violence Act 1995 was introduced, together with amendments to the New Zealand Guardianship Act 1968. A rebuttable presumption against a perpetrator of violence being awarded custody or unsupervised access unless the children's safety can be assured was created. Psychological abuse is defined as domestic violence under the Domestic Violence Act, 40 however, it is not included in the definition of violence in the Principle Act. One Commentator argues, that this is a significant omission, in that a protection order can be granted for example if a child has witnessed abuse but it does not follow that a supervised access order would be made. 41 Busch and Robertson believe these and the other amendments have moved to "close the gap". 42 They comment, "violence against one's spouse, is no longer seen as irrelevant to one's abilities to be a suitable custodial or access parent" however "less positively, we have noted the persistence of discourses about violence reflecting a communication It is the writer's view that in Australia this "two to tango" or "she gave as good as she got" rationale is very real and is significant as to what plays upon sqme Judicial Officer's minds when they entertain applications which deal with family violence.
(b) The Australian Position -Pre-11 June 1996?
In Australia, the Court's approach to family violence has in my view in the past been reflective of Society's view of family violence as a private matter, one which "the public" should not interfere in. It was a matter between "consenting adults" with little effect on children in the household (assuming violence was not directed at the children). For example, In the marriage of Heidt, u Murray J "largely disregarded" the husband's violent behaviour to the wife as "there is no suggestion that Mr Heidt has ever treated his children with the violence with which he treated his wife". Thus, "in assessing his potential as a custodial parent" the violence was largely immaterial. 45 In 1981 Again, the Court appeared to explain away the violence as being a consequence of the "relationship between the parties" and irrelevant to the decision making process. 48 The end of "the silence" in reported decisions came about in 1994. It would appear at that time the Court, seemingly directed by the Chief Justice, had The Family Court of Australia Annual Report 1994-1995 at 67, where, in the Chief Justice's Report a special category was devoted to the issue of family violence. His Honour indicated "that cases involving family violence -both spousal and child abuse -present particular challenges to Judges, other judicial officers and all Court staff". He stated that a day long seminar was conducted at the Judges' Conference in October 1994 "to raise awareness in the judiciary of the causes and consequences of family violence and major plenary session at the Court's national conference which focuses on children who witness domestic violence" was anticipated. His Honour noted "the connections between child and spouse abuse has too often been overlooked in the literature and improperly treated as split issues". In the same Annual Report, "domestic violence" in the cases of Merriman (1994) FLC 92-497, Jaeger (1994) FLC 92-492 and In the marriage of JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515 found recognition as "significant judgment/s". 50 (1994) FLC 92-497. This is the only reported decision with respect to interim custody and family violence I could locate. The case involved interim custody and exclusive occupation of the matrimonial home for two children of the marriage. During those proceedings the wife raised allegations regarding a long history of violence by the husband towards the wife. 51 (1994) FLC 92-492. This was a Full Court appeal on 21 March, 1994. The trial related to custody of a male child 7 years of age who had been in the custody of the husband until trial. The husband was unsuccessful and appealed. One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial Judge, in refusing to admit into evidence an affidavit sworn by the sister of the wife as to violence perpetrated upon the wife by her de facto husband, should have been admitted into evidence and its failure to do so meant there was a mistrial of the proceedings and thus the Court should order a further trial. 52 Ibid at 129.
TONI DICK
(1998) the wife which has already lasted for more than 3 years. 5 
The Full Court were of the view that his Honour was wrong in rejecting the affidavit and ordered a new trial. The Full Court held it was relevant th<* child may be going to a household "where violence may be occurring towards an important figure in his life, namely his mother". 54 One wonders how the trial Judge arrived at the finding violence did not occur "in his relationship with the wife"? Again, the rationale of "mutuality" of violence seems apparent in his reasonings. 55 In the marriage ofJG and BG, 5tì Chisholm CJ felt it opportune to review previous decisions that had been made by the Court which directly or indirectly dealt with family violence or "conduct" of one of the parties. 57 53 Ibid at 130. 54 Ibid. 55 The Judge's findings should not be surprising. Dr Astor in "Violence and Family Mediation: Policy" (1984) 8 AJFL 3 explains that violent men often present as likeable characters and articulate which can often mask a controlling and abusive personality. It is thus extremely dangerous to discount the fact violence could be being perpetrated upon the spouse on a quick assessment of a person's presentation in the witness box (if indeed this is what occurred). 56 (1994) FLC 92-515 at 81,318. This was a custody application involving two children aged two and four years of age. The wife alleged the husband had been violent towards her on a number of occasions and the Court considered the relevance of family violence. The husband's Counsel had argued that some of the passages in the wife's affidavit dealing with violence were inadmissible as they were irrelevant. 57 For example, his Honour referred to In the marriage of Kress (1976) 2 Fam LR 11,230, which did not deal specifically with family violence, however, the trial Judge indicated that "the Court must consider the conduct of the parties, not with a view to revealing one or punishing the other but to ascertain from such conduct whether the welfare of the child would be better served in the custody of one or the other". He further cited In the marriage of Smyth (1983) Fam LR 1029 where the Court held "if there are facts relating to the causes of separation or to martial misconduct which have a real bearing on the fitness of the parent or otherwise affects the child's welfare, these will be considered and given appropriate weight". His Honour also took the opportunity to refer to both decisions of Chandler and Heidt. His Honour stated with respect to these cases "Each was concerned to emphasis the important point that the Family Law Act strictly limits the relevance of marital misconduct. In the context of custody cases the Court has always been properly concerned to prevent parties from engaging in general attacks or smear campaigns that are unrelated to the children's welfare. The Court no doubt felt that it was important to emphasis this in the early years of the Act's operation. This is clearly correct: the principal of the child's welfare is paramount, has exclusionary aspect, excluding material that has no relevance to the welfare of the children, but it also has an inclusionary aspect, by which I mean that admissible evidence that is relevant to the children's welfare should be taken into account. It may be that in their concern to discourage from using custody proceedings as an occasion to engage in a general criticism of each other's behaviour unrelated to the children's welfare, Murray J and Nygh J somewhat overemphasised the exclusionary aspects of the principles. If so, then I must respectfully differ. I believe it is clear law that matters truly relevant to the child's welfare, whether indirectly or directly relevant, should be taken into account." (at 259) The latter two decisions were criticised by R Graycar "The Relevance of Violence in Family Law Decision Making" (1995) 9 AJFL 58 at 60 and Z Rathus "Domestic Violence Update -Family Law Seminar -Kooralbyn", unpublished paper, CLE FLPA, Family Law Residential, 1993. In some cases the Court may be assisted by expert evidence on the impact of violence on the children. Violence may take many forms and have quite a different significance in different cases. It might be, eg. a single outburst out of character caused by a stressful situation for which the violent persons feel immediately regretful and apologetic. It might be the result of mental instability or disease. It might stem from a person's inability to control his or her temper ... The Court's ability to make this determination will be course depend on the evidence available to it. Violence associated with a pattern of dominance for example may be particularly serious. For children to grow up in a climate of a potentially violent and dominating relationship between their parents seems to be to be an unacceptable model of family relationships and would be very likely to create a situation of stress and fear that may well be damaging over a period. It is quite wrong in my opinion that violence can only be relevant if it is directed at the children or takes place in their presence. It is equally wrong to assume that violent behaviour will necessarily be repeated or to assume too readily that it will harm children or to give it excessive importance. It is of course only one factor relevant to the assessment of what the child's welfare requires and it will be more important in some cases than others." 60 (1994) 18 Fam LR 426. This case was a Full Court decision of the Family Court on 27 October 1994. It was an appeal from the trial Judge, Moore J, of an application in relation to the custody, guardianship and access what at trial were 4 and 6 years of age. The wife was granted custody of the children. Evidence was led at trial as to restraining orders taken out by the wife to restrain the husband. The wife alleged the husband was abusive and harassing in continually ringing her and had made threats to kill her. The appeal was based that the manner in which the trial Judge considered violence inflicted upon the wife by the husband was inappropriate and, inter alia, that it was not open to the trial Judge to refer to the body of research referred to by her in her reasons for judgment as this was not the subject of evidence.
QUTLJ She Gave as Good as
TONI DICK (1998) their own behaviour and methods of resolving disputes and dealing with tensions and stress".
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The trial Judge went on further to say:
Yet, while there is much evidence of a positive nature of Mr Patsalou's interaction with the children as a parent and his devotion as a father, his conduct towards the children's mother in physically assaulting her and making derogatory and denigrating remarks, either to her or about her to the children or to others within her circle of friends and acquaintances does not establish him as a consistently desirable role model for the children and leads to questions about his capacity to promote the children's relationship with their mother in the future and his capacity to contribute positively to their balanced development. This has important implications in an assessment of his capacity to effectively parent these children in a positive way in the future." 2 The Full Court upheld the appropriateness of the trial Judge's comments. These decisions, particularly the comments of Moore J, are considered, sensible and consistent with promoting the best interest of children. It appeared the Court was now recognising the impact of violence on children can take many forms and more than a cursory look at the issue was necessary.
However, a disturbing trend with respect to the Court's approach to family violence can be found in two cases dealing with applications under the Hague Convention. It is acknowledged these cases must be considered in light of the particular restrictions of these Regulations and the Court's approach to such applications being of a procedural rather than substantive nature. Nevertheless, interpretations based on "severity of violence" are disturbing.
In the marriage of Murray and Tam: Director, Family Services (ACT) Intervener, 63
the wife had left New Zealand with three children to live in Australia. The wife alleged very serious allegations of family violence by the husband towards her and towards the children. 64 The wife attempted to rely upon the fact the children had been detrimentally affected by the husband's violent behaviour in the past and as such there was "a grave risk that they would be subjected to an intolerable situation and psychological harm if they returned to New Zealand."
The Full Court, despite the very serious nature of the allegations, relied on the facts the evidence was "untested" and as the principle purpose of the Hague Convention was to "discourage child abduction and where such abduction was occurred to return such children to their country of habitual residence", the Court refused to set aside the order of the trial Judge ordering the return of the children. 65 The Full Court appeared to take comfort in the fact the applicant was the New Zealand Department of Justice and as such the notion was the children would be returned into the Department's care rather than to the husband. The Court, in the writer's view, has taken the "soft option" approach and failed to make the tough decision required which would ensure these children's protection.
How can an applicant, in attempting to rely on the "grave risk" exception place "tested" evidence before the Court? If an applicant could, for example, produce a transcript of trial of psychologist's evidence which indicated concerns as to the child's safety, this would suffice. How often in reality will this occur? An almost impossible onus of proof is thus placed on the woman fleeing a violent partner to fall within this "exception".'* What harm must children suffer before the Court will exercise their discretion as provided for in the Regulations and refrain from returning children to a violent man?
A similar concerning authority was the decision of Re Bassi; Bassi and DirectorGeneral, Department of Community Services™ Again, one of the grounds of the appeal from the trial Judge's decision to return the children was they were at grave risk of physical or psychological harm should they be so.
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The allegations raised by the wife were serious indeed, including:
... that the husband drinks alcohol to excess, he has a violent disposition and has frequently been violent, that he has actually physically injured the children in the course of physical attacks on the wife, that he has threatened to kill the children, that by reason of his cultural and social background his threats should be taken seriously ... that on two occasions when the husband was threatening her with a large kitchen knife the child L intervened to prevent the husband causing the wife harm and the child's hands were cut by the knife ... on many occasions after October 1992 the husband threatened that he would kill her, kill the children and kill himself and that some of these threats were made in the presence of the children who became very upset. '' 9 Again the Full Court noted that the allegations:
65 Ibid at 986. 66 N Lemon supra at n35, is of the view that family violence may be argued as a "grave risk" exception avoiding the mandatory return of a child to its place of habitual residence. I agree that theoretically this is the case, but in practice it is not. 67 (1995) FLC 92-465. 68 Fortunately the children were not returned. However, on the exception set out in reg 16(3)(c) which states "the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of the child's views." The child in this case was 13 years of age and the Court had the benefit of a family report upon which to base their decision as to her level of maturity. 69 (1995) FLC 92-465 at 826. Further evidence was placed before the Court through an affidavit of a witness that the husband had told the witness "if he can't have us nobody will and he will do us all in." Despite this, accepted evidence, the Court held that "grave risk" of harm had not been established as it would not be "intolerable" for the children to be returned to their father.
Whilst reported decisions indicate the Court has moved significantly to take into account family violence with respect to custody proceedings, the Court appears to hold a strange view of what amounts to an "intolerable situation" when applying the provisions of the Hague Convention. Section 68F now requires that the Court must take family violence into account when determining what is in the best interests of a child. On its face this is to be applauded, as it firmly directs the Court to be aware of the issue when making child-related decisions. Behrens argues it may however only be a "new rhetoric" and can "disguise value-laden decision making and to allow other interests to be silenced".
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If in a judge's opinion a child's best interests require it, he or she may make an order that is inconsistent with a family violence order and exposes their mother to an (even in his or her opinion) unacceptable risk of family violence ... I would contend however that a woman should not have to argue for her safety based solely on the interests of the child.
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How then has the Court taken family violence into account since the Act's commencement? There appear to be no reported decisions specifically on point to test whether violence was being considered in the Court's decisions. However, the Court's approach to matters dealing with family violence has not altered, despite the new provisions. This view, it is submitted, is supported by the recent Full Court decision of the B and B: Family Law Reform Act case. 76 The case is an important one for many reasons, most significantly with respect to the issue of whether the child's "rights" 77 have such priority so as to predominate over all other matters the 74 Supra n5 at 42. 75 Ibid at 43. For a further discussion of this point see J Harrison and J Behrens, "Inequality, Power and Control: Relevance to Domestic Violence, Responses in the ACT and to the Family Law Reform Bill", paper presented to the First Annual Forum on Justice for Women, National Women's Justice Coalition, Canberra, March 1993, 12 at 16 where they state "while the bests interests of the child must be a child-centred tests it is submitted that the inextricable link between the wellbeing of the child and the custodial mother requires a recognition of the realities and interests of the custodial mother. Promoting women's substantive quality is fundamental to the well-being of women and children in their care. Accordingly, it is submitted that the concept of the best interests of the children should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitutional goal of promoting women's substantive equality". 76 B and B: Family Law Reform Act (1997) 21 FAM LR 676; FLC 92-755. 77 Section 60B of the Act states:
(1) The object of this part is to ensure that children receive adequate parenting to help them achieve their full potential and ensure that parent's fulfil their duties and meet their responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
(2) The principles underlying these objects are that except when it is or would be contrary to a child's best interests:-(a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together;
Court may have historically considered as relevant to a child's best interests. In its judgment, the Court considered the provisions of ss60B, 65E 78 and 68F.
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The Court held that the best interests of the child is the paramount consideration and in deciding what is in the best interests of the child, the Court then has to regard to ss68F and 60B. With respect to s68R the weight "which is attached to any one consideration will depend upon the circumstances of the individual case and is a discretionary exercise by the trial Judge".
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As to the "rights" of the child, the Court found s60B would provide guidance to the Court's consideration of the matters and the overall requirement of s65E. "The matters in s68F(2) are to be considered in the context of the matters in s60B which are relevant in that case. Section 65E defines the essential issue." 81 Thus, whilst the Court is obliged to take into account family violence (as provided for in s68F (2)), it is only one of many factors the Court must consider in its discretion and must be considered in the context of s60B so far as it is relevant.
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The degree of relevance of s68F will largely rest on the expertise and interest of the Judicial Officer in issues of family violence, the skill of the practitioner in drafting the material to identify it as an issue and the skill of the advocate in stressing to ensure its importance to the Court, as to how far it will impact on the decision making process. It is the writer's submission that s68F will not significantly change the Court's approach to the weight attached to family violence.
However, the decision oiB andB is of some comfort to women fleeing violent partners as it confirms they are not required to "jointly" co-parent with their abusive (b) children have the right of contact, on a regular basis, to both their parents and with other people significant to their care, welfare and development; (c) parents share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; (d) parents should agree about the future parenting of their children. 78 Section 65E specifies the Court is required to determine what is in the best interests of the particular child as the paramount consideration. 79 Section 68F sets out a list of matters the Court "must consider" when determining what is in the bests interests of the child. 80 B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995, supra n76 at 132. 81 Ibid at 133. 82 A Dickie in Family Law 3rd ed, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1997, p403 talks of how violence will be relevant. "Acts of violence by a party to proceedings for a parenting order are relevant to the proceedings only to the extent that they have a bearing upon where the best interests of the child lie. Such acts may for example indicate a propensity to violence by the party concerned and this may in turn indicate potential physical or psychological danger to the child. On the other hand, the acts concerned may represent an explosion of otherwise justifiable anger and represent no real danger to the child. Relevant acts of violence are not limited to those against the child personally." Dickie cites In the marriage of JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515 as authority for the above. He goes on further to say that "at the very least a propensity to commit acts of domestic violence may indicate that a person is likely to be a poor role model for the child." Does it follow an act of violence if "it was for good cause" is then discounted? This view appears to be consistent with the view of some members of the Bench. The writer does not believe s68F(2) will change this view.
QUTLJ She Gave as Good as She Got?
ex-partner and confirms freedom of movement of the custodial parent (subject to certain limitations).** In this regard the decision is reflective of the bests interests of the child and ensures that a skewed view of the child's "rights" having priority over what is in their best interests, does not occur/ 4 This hypothesis of the Court's approach to family violence on interim custody/ residence hearings and at trial was tested by a survey of practitioners' experiences. Surveys were sent by the writer to the 55 Accredited Family Law Specialists in Queensland to try to illicit data with respect to unreported decisions covering these issues. Fifteen responses were received. It is acknowledged the survey has its limitations/ 5 The questionnaire sought data pre and post the Act's commencement. 83 The case was an appeal against Jordan J's decision to allow the wife to leave Cairns to move to Victoria with the two children of the marriage. The husband opposed the wife's move with the children. The parties had been separated for approximately five years and whilst there were difficulties between them the children had regular and meaningful contact and a good relationship with their father. The wife wished to remarry and this was her primary reason for moving to Victoria. A family report was prepared which indicated the children had a good relationship with both parents, but appeared to be very attached to their mother, and wished to be where their mother resided. A concern raised by Jordan J (trial judge) was the impact upon the mother should the judge restrain her from removing the children from Cairns. He was of the view this could have possibly impacted on her ability to parent the children in the manner she had parented so effectively to date and could affect the relationship between the parents, such that problems could occur with respect to contact which would flow on to the children. " (1996) 10 AJFL 18 compares the two Acts and identifies the issue of independent or cooperative joint parenting model with respect to parental responsibility in both Acts (and s60B). It was the view of Dewar that as the Reform Act was silent in providing "that either parent may discharge their parental responsibility independently of the other" (at 26), this was one indicator that cooperative parenting was required by the Act. Dewar indicated "Neither, however, is there an explicit requirement that one parent consults the other before making a major decision". This appears to have been resolved in the decision of B and B subsequent to this article, in that the Court held: "In the absence of a specific issues order, we think it unlikely that the parliament intended that separated parents could only exercise all or any of their powers or discharge all or any of their parenting responsibilities jointly in relation to all matters. This is never the case when parents are living together in relation to day to day matters and the impracticability of such a requirement when they are living separately only has to be stated to be appreciated. As a matter of practical necessity, either the resident parent or the contact parent will have to make individual decisions about such matters when they have the sole physical care of the children. On the other hand, consultation should obviously occur between the parents in relation to major issues affecting the children, such as major surgery, place of education, religion and the like. We believe that this accords with the intention of the legislation". (Unreported, Full Court, 9 July 1997 at 123-124) . 85 The criticisms which could be mounted of the survey include as follows:
(a) a definition of domestic violence ("family violence" in this paper) was not given with the questionnaire. • Approximately 64% of cases which sought interim residence orders involved allegations of family violence;
9,1
• Of the cases involving allegations of family violence, in approximately 13% of cases the mother was unsuccessful in obtaining interim residence;
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• 41% of those cases involved the wife removing the children from the home;
• In 68% of cases the wife was primary caregiver; 95 and • The average number of cases where the Court took family violence into account on an interim basis was interestingly, in only 63% of those cases where family violence was alleged.
Despite the survey's limitations, it is suggested the following may be argued with respect to the Court's current approach to family violence:
• Family violence is an issue in 64% of cases presenting to the Court for interim residence decisions; • Despite the mandatory factors set out in s68F, the Court only takes family violence into account in approximately 63% of cases where family violence is an issue; and • Women lose interim residence in approximately 13% of those cases where violence is an issue.
It is my view the survey results lend some support to the hypotheses:
• Family violence is an issue in the many cases appearing before the Family Court;
• Section 68F requirements have not significantly altered the Court's approach to family violence and particularly the result of interim residence decisions. Numerous cases present to the Court where a woman has, in flight from violence, removed children from the matrimonial home and then has been faced with either an ex-parte custody order and warrant for the delivery up of the children to the husband's care or the prospects of an interim custody/residence hearing. These women are often labelled "child abductors". On an interim basis, women have be^" at risk of losing custody/residence of their children under the facade of the father and home providing "stability" for the children. This is particularly so if it has been some months from the date of separation when the children and mother are eventually located by the Federal Police attempting to enforce a warrant. These women face a difficult battle to retain care of their children, notwithstanding the fact many of these women acted in what they believed was the best interests of the child in removing the child from a violent household.
Apart from the concern that until fairly recently ex-parte custody orders appeared to be readily given by the Court, the concern is as to how the Court treats family violence, if at all, on an interim hearing. It is a rare case indeed that a perpetrator would, on material placed before the Court, admit he has perpetrated violence upon his wife. Women often hide the abuse from family, friends and the medical profession. Thus they have no witnesses, often save the children, to support their story. If no-one will come forward on their behalf, why should the Court believe them? How can the Court take into account "untested" evidence on an interim basis? Unfortunately for the women involved this is compounded further as by the time the matter comes to the Court for interim hearing, particularly if the perpetrator has been required to attend the Court on numerous repeated occasions to obtain, for example recovery and location orders, the Court has developed a sympathy for the perpetrator. Allegations then raised by the mother as to family violence may fall on deaf ears. The children are returned to the perpetrator's household and "stability" is assured? By the time of trial, sometimes more than 12 months later, % "status quo" has been established. 97 Unless a very negative recommendation is made against 
the father via a family report (the issue of family reports will not be explored in this article, although there are concerns that some counsellors fail to appreciate the impact of family violence on children and this is reflected in sometimes ill-con-, ceived recommendations), the prospects of the mother, who has in many cases been primary caregiver, of retaining the children is negligible.
The assumption that the interests of the child are best protected on an interim basis if the status quo is preserved is based on an underlying presumption that it is ordinarily better for a child to continue to live in his or her established environment than to undergo disruption to his or her life by changing residence on an interim basis. Any inconvenience or problems caused by such disruption would of course only be compounded if the Judge at the final hearing was to order that the child return to live with the parent who was originally looking after him or her. The Family Court gives no weight to the existence of violence. It adopts an ostrich like attitude of the paramountcy of the interests of the child as the situation exists at the time of the Court hearing completely ignores how the situation has evolved... It is very convenient for (the Judge) totally to ignore the history of violence in the marriage. There is no mention of it any where in the judgment... It seems that the message of my case is that a woman must not leave a dreadful and revolting relationship unless she can get the children out with her. If she leaves without the children then she will effectively have all the relevant facts before it or may not in any event have an opportunity to conduct a thorough enquiry into the facts before making its decision, the Court may reasonably assume that the interests of the child are best protected on an interim basis if the "status quo" is preserved; in other words, if the child continues to live in his or her established environment for the time being. The assumption of where the best interests of the child lie can be displaced by evidence to the contrary. 98 Australian Family Law Guide supra n97, para 14277. 99 For a discussion of why "women stay", see RP Dobasch and RE Dobasch "Violence Against Wives:
A Case Against the Patriarchy" Free Press New York, 1979 and "Queensland Domestic Violence Taskforce Report", supra nl5 at 68. "To ask why women stay with violent men is to pre-suppose that women simply stay or leave, when in fact most make repeated attempts to escape the violence, leaving and staying for different periods of time until eventually they leave permanently. Each time a women leaves, even though she may return to the relationship, she is developing the resources she needs to separate finally ... Many women succeed in leaving sometimes immediately after the first beating and sometimes after years of violence." (as quoted, Family Violence Professional Education Taskforce Family Violence -Everybody's Business Somebody's Life (1994) at 81. 100 Supra n71 at 9 (confidential submission on file with Graycar and ALRC). lose them. As status quo is established by fair means or foul and the status quo will then prevail .J 01 This is certainly the experience of the writer of the difficulties women face to overturn a custody decision at trial once they have lost interim custody. In one case in 1992, 102 at the interim hearing in Sydney, the Judicial Registrar indicated that he would be ordering the return of the children to their familiar environment (ensuring "stability") and the husband's care.
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During the course of a break in the hearing, the parties effected a reconciliation. Not surprisingly, as is the case for many women who return to violent homes, the reconciliation did not last and a few months later the wife left again with the children. The husband filed again seeking ex-parte custody orders. One wonders whether the wife was eventually located and the children returned to the husband. As the Court did not give weight to the impact of violence on the children previously and based its decision on the issue of "stability", the likelihood of the Court giving any weight to the violence when she fled a second time would probably be remote.
In another 1992 case, 104 at the interim hearing his Honour heard submissions from the bar table and had read material from the wife as to a history of violence. The wife admitted to hitting the husband on one occasion, in retaliation, whilst he was beating her. The wife lost clumps of hair during the incident and received bruising. The husband was unmarked. This incident led the Court to make a finding that, despite numerous allegations by the wife of repeated physical attacks upon her by the husband and emotional and controlling behaviour that "she gave as good as she got". In one sentence, the Court discounted the impact of family violence upon her and the children, imposing "mutuality" of violence. Fortunately for the wife, the Court considered that as the wife proposed to return to the home and to return the children to their former school, then "stability" would be satisfied in leaving the children with the wife. 
In a 1995 case, the issue of violence on an interim basis was again raised. 106 The husband in his material alleged the wife was suffering from psychiatric disturbances and was alcohol dependent. As a result of the decision in Re K, 107 the appointment of a separate representative (now called "Child Representative") was ordered. An adjourned date eight weeks later was given. At the next return date the Separate Representative informed the Court that a family report was being arranged for the assistance of the Court at interim hearing. Whilst this was probably a perfectly correct course, the obvious result was that by the time the report was prepared and the interim hearing took place (which turned out to be nearly four months from the initial application) a "status quo" had been established. Despite the fact very concerning allegations of repeated physical abuse upon the wife by the husband (which was in part admitted to by the husband, but a "she made me do it" and "she gave as good as she got" defence was mounted by him), the violence was discounted. The Court felt bound by the principles in Cilento -the violence was not "convincing proof" the child was in physical or moral danger in the husband's care. (Did not the husband allege the violence was mutual?) Eighteen months passed from the interim hearing to date of trial. The wife ultimately conceded custody to the husband as the prospects of success after such an interval of time was questionable. 108 These unreported decisions suggest that the Court often equates "stability" on an interim basis as synonymous with the home in which the child had been living in and school the child attended -violence to the mother, if not discounted as "mutual", is avoided or ignored. 109 This is not, it is respectfully submitted, a correct interpretation of the principles in Cilento -it is the situation rather than the home/school that the Court must consider when addressing the issue of stability. Surely a violent man cannot provide a stable environment/situation for children?
Where a mother who has left the family home as a result of violence and arranges suitable and certain living arrangements for the child on an interim basis, this must equate with "stability" for that child (assuming the mother is otherwise an appropriate caregiver)? To award interim custody to a perpetrator does nothing more than create a "facade of stability" which often rewards a perpetrator with "status quo" and success at trial.
It is the view of the writer that the existence of family violence must be "convincing proof" the child's physical or mental health or moral welfare will be really endangered by the child remaining where he/she is until a contested application is heard". 110 These difficulties women face on interim hearings are further compounded as a result of the very strict time limits including the "two hour rule", the limit on affidavit material that can be relied upon (at least in the Brisbane Registry) 111 and the inability to cross examine witnesses.
Doolan is of the view 112 this practice has a significant impact, eg in cases such as Cand C m where the Court refused to grant an adjournment to respond to a lengthy affidavit filed on behalf of the husband seeking custody of the two children of the marriage. The wife was ultimately unsuccessful on an interim basis and an order was made that the children be returned to the matrimonial home and prior schooling arrangements. 114 Once interim custody is lost, time runs against many women. Each day without 110 In the marriage of Cilento (1980) FLC 90-847 at 75,346. The difficulty with respect to establishing the criteria "convincing proof" is that it is only in "serious" cases where, for example, a wife is hospitalised or there is medical evidence to support physical abuse, the Court may be convinced the violence has occurred. Otherwise the Court is faced with allegations raised by the wife which are usually denied by the perpetrator on material. Given these difficulties it may be said is it any wonder that the Court has historically not taken family violence into account on an interim basis. Some solace can be obtained in the decision of In the marriage of Merryman (1994) FLC 92-497 at 81,171 where the Court awarded interim custody (and exclusive use of the matrimonial home) to the wife specifically taking into account the husband's violence as a danger to the wife and children and what was required by the Court so as to ensure stability in the child's lives. Weight was also given to the fact the mother was the children's primary caregiver. 111 See Practice Note published by the Brisbane Registry Family Court "Guidelines to the Conduct of Proceedings in the Duty List" June 1995. The "two hour rule" applies to all contested duty list matters which includes time for reading of material and for the judgment. There is no longer the provision for the matter to be transferred from the Duty List to the Pending Cases List to be heard as a short defended matter. 112 For a discussion of interim custody practice directions and the impact upon interim hearings of the practice direction, see P Doolan supra n96. 113 (1995) 20 Fam LR 20. 114 Jordan J found that the parents had shared caregiving for the children prior to separation and the husband had the benefit of assistance from his parents who resided next door. The wife appealed on the basis she was denied justice as she was refused the adjournment and was unable to crossexamine the husband.
